Due to the tremendous cooling costs, data center cooling efficiency improvement has been actively pursued for years. In addition to cooling efficiency, the reliability of the cooling system is also essential for guaranteed uptime. In traditional data center cooling system design with N+1 or higher redundancy, all the computer room air conditioning (CRAC) units are either constantly online or cycled according to a predefined schedule. Both cooling system configurations, however, have their respective drawbacks. Data centers are usually over provisioned when all CRAC units are online all the time, and hence the cooling efficiency is low. On the other hand, although cooling efficiency can be improved by cycling CRAC units and turning off the backups, it is difficult to schedule the cycling such that sufficient cooling provisioning is guaranteed and gross over provisioning is avoided. In this paper, we aim to maintain the data center cooling redundancy while achieving high cooling efficiency. Using model-based thermal zone mapping, we first partition data centers to achieve the desired level of cooling influence redundancy. We then design a distributed controller for each of the CRAC units to regulate the thermal status within its zone of influence. The distributed controllers coordinate with each other to achieve the desired data center thermal status using the least cooling power. When CRAC units or their associated controllers fail, racks in the affected thermal zones are still within the control "radius" of other decentralized cooling controllers through predefined thermal zone overlap, and hence their thermal status is properly managed by the active CRAC units and controllers. Using this failure resistant data center cooling control approach, both cooling efficiency and robustness are achieved simultaneously. A higher flexibility in cooling system maintenance is also expected, since the distributed control system can automatically adapt to the new cooling facility configuration incurred by maintenance.
INTRODUCTION
Availability and total cost of ownership are two of the most important data center performance metrics. The former is a data center level service agrement to the hosting customers, while the latter indicates how much it costs to build and operate a data center. To guarantee uptime and hence uninterrupted operation, redundancy is usually built into the data center power and cooling infrastructure. On the power side, uninterruptible power supplies (UPS) have been installed in almost all data centers for IT equipment and in some cases the cooling equipment as well. In order to achieve the highest level of redundancy, typically required only by enterprise (e.g. banks), two complete and separate power paths could also be constructed for "2N" power redundancy (referred by the Uptime Institute as Tier IV). Unlike power delivery within data centers with defined paths to each rack, the shared underfloor plenum of a raised floor data center means that cooling resources from multiple cooling units could mix before they reach a specific rack inlet, and it might be difficult to characterize the influence of each cooling unit. As a result, a serious investigation can not be embarked without a clear definition of data center cooling redundancy and how we can characterize it for any given data center.
ASHRAE [1] defines a room level cooling redundancy of "N" as a cooling system that sufficiently cools a room, and "N+k" cooling redundancy as the addition of extra "k" cooling units. This definition, as pointed out in [2] , does not differentiate between important cooling system configuration parameters such as size, cooling capacity, and placement of the cooling units. Recognizing these drawbacks, rack level cooling redundancy is defined in [2] as the number of simultaneous cooling unit failures in all possible combinations that a particular rack can withstand. Although a big leap from the previous ASHRAE definition, the cooling redundancy definition in [2] does not clearly state whether the cooling units have their respective fixed cooling resource provisioning setting or whether they are allowed to change the cooling settings and adapt to the current thermal status. This question leads to the distinction between what the authors of the present paper call "static redundancy" and "dynamic redundancy".
"Static redundancy" means that the cooling system could withstand the failure of cooling units without making any adjustments to the still functioning cooling units. In contrast, "dynamic redundancy" means that the cooling system can remedy the hazardous thermal environment caused by cooling unit failures through the best possible utilization of the cooling units still available, which may include a series of automated adjustments to the cooling settings. For both cases, it is assumed that the data center indoor thermal status is allowed to deviate from the desired conditions within a certain range for a limited time period. It is obvious that in order to maintain static redundancy, very significant over provisioning of cooling can be expected when no cooling unit is malfunctioning since the cooling system is designed for the worst case scenario. Because of the aforementioned reason, higher static cooling redundancy will inevitably lead to higher cooling power costs. These costs can be avoided by adopting dynamic cooling redundancy, which is achieved by a cooling controller aiming for just enough cooling resource provisioning no matter how many cooling unit failures occur. Such a failure resistant controller guarantees best efforts to meet the target thermal status with the minimum cooling costs possible. Compared with a static cooling configuration, a well designed active cooling controller can reconfigure the cooling resource provisioning and distribution in response to cooling unit failures, and hence can remedy a situation in which the static configuration will lead to unacceptable thermal conditions.
While there has been work on data center cooling control [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] , little work has been reported on the design of such a failure resistant cooling control system that is able to automatically respond to both normal and failed cooling unit(s) operation modes with optimized cooling resource provisioning and distribution. In order to bridge this gap, this paper proposes a distributed failure resistant cooling controller design through model-based thermal zone mapping and managed overlap between the thermal zones of neighboring cooling units. Based on a holistic model describing how rack inlet temperatures are affected by a multitude of CRAC units, each rack inlet temperature can be assigned to the thermal zones of "k" CRAC units that have the most significant influence over this particular rack inlet temperature to achieve "N+k" cooling influence redundancy. If sufficient cooling resources are available, "N+k" cooling redundancy can be guaranteed; otherwise, best effort cooling control will be enforced to mitigate the adverse effects that might be caused by cooling unit(s) failure.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly introduces our model-based thermal zone mapping method and how a failure resistant controller can be designed to achieve the desired cooling influence redundancy. The failure resistant cooling controller is experimentally validated in Section 3 to demonstrate its ability to handle unexpected cooling unit/controller failures. Finally, Section 4 concludes the paper with a summary of the work presented.
Model-Based Thermal Zone Mapping and Robust Cooling Controller Design
In the early work of dynamic smart cooling [3] , a thermal zone is used to define a region of a data center over which a cooling unit has significant influence. By finding the thermal zone of each cooling unit within a data center, the global data center cooling problem can be divided into a number of subproblems, in which the duty of each cooling unit is to maintain the desirable thermal status within its zone of influence. Originally, thermal zones are established using thermal correlation index (TCI) values. As defined in Eqn.1, TCI i, j quantifies the steady-state response of the i th rack inlet temperature to a step change in the supply air temperature (SAT) of the j th cooling unit [3] .
TCI values can be found experimentally through a data center commissioning process [3] , or it can be estimated from the historical data of CRAC units operation and associated rack inlet temperature trajectories [9] . Using TCI values, a thermal zone is defined for the j th cooling unit by assigning it the i th rack inlet location if TCI i, j ≥ λ , where λ is a predefined threshold.
Since the concept of a thermal zone was introduced, various methods have been developed in addition to the original TCI based method for thermal zone mapping. Using potential flow based simulation in conjunction with real time measurements, methods have been proposed to find thermal zones either from the air flow velocity field [10] or by solving a boundary value problem for convective transport in [11] . The benefit of these simulation based methods is that they can be easily applied to investigate various data center IT and cooling configurations for insights. The drawback, however, is that the geometry, power, and cooling configurations of the data center under investigation can only be modeled with a limited level of detail, and hence the simulation results obtained might not reflect what is happening within the data center with desirable accuracy. In addition to simulation based methods, a statistical approach for thermal zone mapping is discussed in [12] , in which each rack inlet temperature is modeled as a weighted sum of all cooling units' supply air temperatures plus a random error process, with the option to include spatial correlations between adjacent rack inlet temperatures. The blower speed of the cooling units, however, is not considered in the model of [12] , which means that the model could have limited applicability to data centers cooled by cooling units with fixed blower speeds only. When variable frequency drives are installed for the cooling units, the rack temperature model in [12] may fail to capture the characteristics of the data center, since each new blower speeds configuration could lead to a new air flow distribution within the data center and hence a new set of weights for the model.
Summarizing the aforementioned thermal zone mapping methods, we can find that they are either simulation based and hence of limited accuracy [10, 11] , or they only capture the steady-state/static characteristics within the data center [3, 12] , leaving out the system dynamics which might be too important to ignore. To overcome these drawbacks, we propose a modelbased thermal zone mapping method detailed below with adjustable overlap between neighboring zones.
Model-Based Thermal Zone Mapping
For air cooled data centers with raised floors with or without vent tile opening adjustments, general dynamic models have been developed in the authors' previous work [5, 7] . The temperature dynamics of a single rack inlet temperature T at discrete time steps k and k + 1, for example, is described by the following equation [7] :
in which SAT j and V FD j are the supply air temperature and blower speed of the j th CRAC unit, g j quantifies the combined influences of VFD and SAT tuning of the j th CRAC unit, C(k) captures the effect of recirculated hot hair, and N CRAC is the number of CRAC units. A higher value of g j means that the j th CRAC unit has larger influence over this rack inlet temperature and vice versa. The parameters of this computationally efficient model can be found through model identification experiments.
For a data center with N T rack inlet temperature sensors, the re-
with nonnegative items is used to define the thermal zones.
For rack inlet temperature T i , define
we can then assign rack inlet temperature location i to the j th CRAC unit using either of the following three criteria:
In the criteria above, λ A and λ R are absolute and relative thresholds to determine if a CRAC unit has enough influence over a specific rack inlet temperature and hence can incorporate it into its thermal zone. In comparison, the third criterion is based on the ranking of CRAC units' influence.
The first criterion is similar to what dynamic smart cooling [3] uses and the absolute threshold λ A should be carefully chosen to avoid orphaned rack inlet temperature locations that are not incorporated into any thermal zone. The second criterion compares across all CRAC units, and the relative threshold λ R can be tuned from 1, for disjointed but complete data center thermal zone partitioning, to 0 for full overlap between all thermal partitions. The third criterion also compares across all CRAC units, but it explicitly chooses the first m CRAC units that have more significant influence over rack inlet temperature location i than the other CRAC units.
Failure Resistant Cooling Controller Design
The failure resistant cooling controller we propose is built upon both appropriate control system structure selection and managed thermal zone overlap between neighboring CRAC units.
For data centers with multiple CRAC units, we adopt a decentralized control system structure where each CRAC unit is controlled by a dedicated controller to manage the IT equipment thermal status within its thermal zone. Compared with a centralized controller that monitors the entire data center thermal status and manages all the CRAC units, the decentralized controllers can avoid the risk of a single point of failure. Further more, by dividing the entire data center into a number of thermal zones each covering part of the data center, the decentralized controllers have less intensive computational requirements and hence can be implemented with shorter control intervals. Figure 1 conceptually illustrates the proposed decentralized control system structure for a data center with three CRAC units, in which T i (i = 1, 2, 3) are vectors containing rack inlet temperatures of the i th thermal zone. It can be seen from Fig. 1 that if one FIGURE 1 . DECENTRALIZED CONTROL SYSTEM STRUC-TURE of the CRAC units (CRAC unit # 1, for example) fails, T 1 will increase and the temperature increase in the overlap regions will be sensed by controller 2 and 3 since both thermal zones overlap with thermal zone 1. Decentralized controllers 2 and 3 will then respond with more provisioning of cooling resources from CRAC units 2 and 3 to ensure satisfactory thermal status within their respective thermal zones, which helps alleviate the potential hazardous thermal status of zone 1 caused by the failure of CRAC # 1. For the special case shown in Fig. 1 , the thermal zone partition does not lead to even an "N+1" cooling influence redundancy since each thermal zone has at least part of it not covered by any other thermal zone.
In order to ensure "N+k" cooling influence redundancy, the third thermal zone partitioning criterion in the previous subsection can be employed with m = k + 1, which ensures each rack inlet temperature is covered by at least k + 1 thermal zones, and hence even in the case of k failing CRAC units there is still at least one functioning CRAC unit trying to maintain each specific rack inlet temperature at desirable thermal status. Note that "N+k" cooling influence redundancy only ensures that each rack inlet temperature is continuously monitored and controlled by "k+1" CRAC units, but does not necessarily lead to "N+k" cooling redundancy as defined in [2] that guarantees satisfactory data center thermal status in the event of "k" failed CRAC units in any possible combination. Cooling influence redundancy focuses on using available cooling resource for improved cooling redundancy, and hence does not have any specific requirements on the size of cooling resource pool. It is reasonable to target "N+1" cooling influence redundancy since the possibilities of controller instability due to CRAC units interactions can be reduced by limiting thermal zone overlap between at most two thermal zones.
Within each thermal zone, only information about the local CRAC unit is available to the decentralized zonal controller, the simplified model for a rack inlet temperature T in the j th zone is thus:
where the influence of recirculation and CRAC units outside of the j th zone is lumped into C(k). Using this model, a model predictive cooling controller as described in [7] can be designed for each thermal zone to minimize the cooling cost incurred, which includes both the blower power of the CRAC unit and the chiller power. The interested readers can refer to [7] for controller implementation details.
Experimental Validation and Results
The proposed failure resistant cooling controller is implemented and evaluated through experiments in a research data center, and we present part of the experimental results in this section. Figure 2 shows the experimental data center with 10 rows of racks and 8 CRAC units. All of the racks hosted are fully instrumented with 5 temperature sensors in the front and another 5 in the back at different heights. The red dash-dot lines delineate hot aisles containment using walls, ceiling, and plastic sheets hanging from the ceiling. Targeting "N+1" cooling influence redundancy, we establish a thermal zone for each of the 8 CRAC units such that each of the 220 rack inlet temperatures is found in exactly two thermal zones by using the third criterion of Section 2.1 and setting m to two. Within each thermal zone, T vio max is defined as the maximum temperature violation over the specified threshold observed among all rack inlet temperatures, which is preferred to be negative and maintained close to 0. The rack inlet temperature reporting the maximum violation within each thermal zone is known as the master sensor, and a master sensor could be shared by neighboring zones since each rack inlet temperature is covered by two thermal zones in our "N+1" cooling influence redundancy data center partition. A model predictive controller as described in [7] is implemented for each thermal zone, and all 8 decentralized controllers run on the same server without mutual communication.
TestBed and Cooling Controller Implementation
What we aim to find through experiments includes:
1. In the case a CRAC unit fails, are the remaining CRAC units able to mitigate any thermal violations automatically? 2. In "N+1" cooling influence redundancy setup, is the failure resistant cooling controller able to handle more than one failing CRAC units?
Since the proposed failure resistant cooling controller design builds upon the decentralized data center cooling controller in [7] , other disturbances commonly witnessed within data centers, such as change of rack inlet temperature thresholds or blockage of air flow to a rack by a technician placing a tool box over the vent tiles, can be readily handled by the failure resistant cooling controller and the interested readers can refer to [7] for some experimental results. In the rest of the paper, we focus on major cooling disturbances caused by the failure of CRAC unit(s).
FIGURE 2. LAYOUT OF THE EXPERIMENTAL DATA CENTER

Single CRAC Unit Failure
The evaluation of the failure resistant cooling controller starts with a single CRAC unit failure (CRAC unit # 3) by manually turning off the CRAC unit. For the 4-hour experiment shown in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 , CRAC unit 3 is turned off at t = 1hr, and before that the entire data center had reached a relatively steady condition under the control of the decentralized controllers. CRAC units # 1 and # 2 share the same master sensor located at rack B2. Similarly, master sensor sharing occurs between CRAC units # 3 and # 4, between CRAC units # 5 and # 6, and between CRAC units # 7 and # 8, respectively.
Right after CRAC unit # 3 fails, a sharp increase of T vio max is observed for thermal zone # 1 through # 4, which are closer to the failing CRAC unit and hence most affected by the CRAC unit failure. Zone # 3 and zone # 4 share the same master sensor throughout the 4-hour experiment, and their respective trajectories of T vio max overlap in Fig. 3(a) . Similarly, sharing of the master sensor also happens between zones # 1 and # 2. In both cases, the sharing of master sensors comes from the thermal zone mapping we implemented to ensure"N+1" cooling influence redundancy, and hence in our decentralized cooling controller design each rack inlet temperature falls into exactly 2 distinct thermal zones of the 8 CRAC units.
Due to sharing of a master sensor between zone # 3 and # 4, the compromised thermal status in zone # 3 is detected by the cooling controller of zone # 4, and hence CRAC unit # 4 responds promptly with reduced SAT and increased blower speed as shown in Fig. 4 . In order to compensate for the loss of cooling capacity and to drive zone # 3 to a desirable thermal condition, CRAC unit # 4 lowers its SAT nearly 6 • C in less than an hour, and at the same time increases its blower speed by more than 20%. This increase in cooling resource provisioning leads to a 100% peak load of CRAC unit # 4, which eventually stabilizes at around 60%. The thermal status of zone # 3, however, returns to a satisfactory condition denoted by a negative T vio max within 1 hour, demonstrating the effectiveness of the failure resistant cooling controller.
It is shown in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 that the failure of CRAC # 3 also brings adverse effects to the thermal status of zone # 1 and # 2, although the maximum temperature excursion is much smaller. Due to master sensor sharing, zones # 1 and # 2 also work together to provide more cooling resources to drive their thermal status back to normal, showing that the failure resistant cooling controller design also leads to good coordination between functioning CRAC units.
Another interesting finding from Fig. 3(b) is that turning off a low load CRAC unit, in this case CRAC unit # 3, might not lead to cooling power savings but could instead result in higher cooling cost as indicated by the significant load increase of CRAC unit # 1 and # 4. This could be attributed to the insufficient amount of air flow due to CRAC failure, and as a result the air provisioned has to be of much lower temperature, which leads to much larger load (chilled water valve opening) for chilled water cooled CRAC units. At the beginning of this experiment, only 7 CRAC units are operating since CRAC unit # 3 is already turned off. Around t = 1hr, CRAC unit # 2 is turned off to emulate a multiple CRAC units failure. The failure of CRAC unit # 2 impacts the thermal status of CRAC unit # 1, # 4, # 5, and # 6, and T vio max of each zone is shown in Fig. 5(a) . Indicated in Fig. 5(a) by the overlapping trajectories of T vio max , master sensor sharing still exists between zone # 1 and # 2, and between zone # 3 and # 4. Since CRAC units # 2 and # 3 both fail, the temperature excursions are handled by the still functioning CRAC unit # 1 and # 4, respectively, both of which respond with lower SAT and higher VFD to increase the cooling resource provisioning as shown in Fig.  6 . The additional cooling resources help bring the thermal status within zones # 1 through # 4 back to desirable conditions. Although far from the failing CRAC unit # 2, zone # 5 and # 6 are affected by the disturbance created as well, although to a lower degree than zones # 1 through # 4. CRAC unit # 6 almost returns to its original cooling settings after the transient disturbance, since it is farthest away from the failing CRAC unit # 2. CRAC unit # 5, on the other hand, ends up with lower SAT and higher VFD after the disturbance settles down. The variations of the CRAC units' loads can be found in 5(b).
The results we have just discussed show that the failure resistant cooling controller also has the potential of handling multiple cooling unit failures in an automatic fashion, which greatly increases the robustness of the cooling system. To further test the failure mitigation capability of the proposed cooling controller design, we turned off CRAC unit # 5 in addition to CRAC units # 2 and # 3, and satisfactory thermal status was still maintained for the entire data center after some transients. The results are not shown here due to space limitation.
The failure resistant cooling controller design presented can be used in conjunction with the Uptime Institute data center tier standard for enhanced redundancy and failure recovery capability. The research data center used for the experimental validation above, for example, has redundant CRAC units but nonredundant distribution path to the IT equipment, and hence is classified as Tier II. According to the Uptime Institute standard [13] , unplanned CRAC unit failures may impact the computer equipment. This compact, however, can be mitigated by deploying the failure resistant cooling controller for improved availability as we demonstrated above. 
Conclusions
In this paper, we introduce an improved thermal zone mapping approach based on the computationally efficient dynamic model we develop for raised floor data centers, and demonstrate how well managed thermal zone mapping together with decentralized real-time cooling controllers provides non-compromised cooling redundancy while minimizing cooling costs. The experimental validation in a research data center shows that our failure resistant cooling controller design is capable of handling single and multiple CRAC unit failures and driving the data center thermal status to the desired conditions. The decentralized failure resistant cooling controller design could be implemented for large scale data centers to improve cooling redundancy and efficiency simultaneously.
